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Abstract 
In political campaigns the strategic use of resources, including time and money, are often critical in 
optimizing performance. !twill not always be the difference in winning and losing, but it is often the 
most important factor in running an effective campaign. Specifically, within field operations, the area in 
which the campaign directly connects with the voter, and a Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) operation, the 
trade-offs between seemingly miniscule choices can mean the difference in the ultimate success or 
failure of a political campaign. 
Using data from the 2010 Lexington Mayoral campaign of challenger Jim Gray, this study evaluates the 
effectiveness of GOTV targeting using a pro bit model and the individual and overall effectiveness of the 
field techniques or elements utilized with a liner regression model. Within the pro bit model, there are 
two dependent variables. The first is the designation by the Jim Gray campaign of precincts as "Get Out 
the Vote" target precincts. Of 285 precincts with this information, 105 were so designated. The second 
is the change in the percentage of votes received by Jim Gray in the runoff. The linear regression has five 
measures for field operations: Staff/Volunteer canvass, paid employee canvass, staff/volunteer Get Out 
the Vote activity, paid employee Get Out the Vote activity, and whether a house party was conducted. 
The pro bit model showed the best predictor of a GOTV target precinct was an Isaac precinct with a 
predicted effect of 5 percentage points per point of Isaac's primary percentage and a large z score of 
6.45 (p<0.001). Closely following the Isaac precinct score, was a Gray primary precinct with a predicted 
effect of 3.5 percentage points per point Gray's primary percentage and a large z score of 5.92 
(p<0.001). 
On the question of what characteristics tended to make a precinct targeted, the results show very 
clearly that the precinct being one in which Teresa Isaac was successful in the primary election mattered 
a lot. This reinforces, on a scientific level, the perception held among informed political observers; that 
the endorsement of Teresa Isaac had a major impact on her supporters, who did turn out and vote for 
Jim Gray in the general election. 
In terms of the effectiveness of the field operations, the results are somewhat surprising, given the 
review of literature. None of the individual field elements meet the minimum scores for significance, 
nor did they collectively. The larger take away suggests that voters were going to vote how they were 
going to vote, regardless of any contact from the campaign. 
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I. Introduction 
In political campaigns the strategic use of resources, including time and money, are often critical 
in optimizing performance. It will not always be the difference in winning and losing, but it is often the 
most important factor in running an effective campaign. Candidate campaigns at almost any level will 
consist of several main components: communications, finance, and field operations. Communications 
handles the campaign message and its delivery, finance raises the funds necessary to conduct the work 
of the campaign, and field operations are charged with managing individual voters, or subsets of voters. 
While the other components are critical, the focus of this study is to examine and understand 
the strategy involved with conducting effective field operations (field). The broad goal of field is to 
identify and turnout the supporters of an issue or candidate. Depending on the scope and budget of a 
given campaign, this goal is approached in a number of ways. Generically, field will consist of 
administering and recording direct voter contact (DVC) via phone banking and door-to-door canvassing, 
handling the distribution of yard signs, and conducting the voter turnout operation on, or in the days 
leading up to, the actual election day, often called Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV). 
In terms of the strategic, targeted use of resources within a field operation, the challenge is to 
identify and turnout the number of supporters necessary to win an election within a limited time-frame 
and budget. Therefore the need to target specific voters or subsets of voters is paramount to success. 
Targeting can be determined at the individual and voter subset level by demographics, voting history, 
already defined preferences or any other number of characteristics depending on the campaign, its 
budget, or its ability to access, analyze and apply data or information that are relevant or actionable. 
Most field operations will conduct some sort of major effort on, or in the days directly leading 
up to, election day. Most often this element of a field operation or program is referred to as its Get-
Out-The-Vote operation, or GOTV. Campaigns will seek to contact their supporters one or more times in 
the final days before an election with a message reminding supporters to vote. Subsequently, a GOTV 
operation is developed to be as robust as possible. The most effective GOTV operations require extreme 
organization, strong managers, a large and well-trained volunteer base and excellent targeting. These 
operations are intense and their success can often mean the overall success or failure of the entire 
campaign. A spectacularly successful GOTV campaign might lift an overmatched candidate from 28 to 
38 percent or a competitive candidate from 48 to 58 percent. (Green and Gerber 2004) 
In terms of the specific, actual contact with the voter, there is some debate, on a cost-benefit 
basis, as to whether a GOTV contact (a single campaign supporter or staff member contacting a single 
voter at their door) is most effective when it is an actual door knock and short conversation with a 
supporter, or if simply leaving a door hanger or other piece of campaign literature is a sufficient method 
to employ. Additionally, most large and financially successful campaigns, will supplement the GOTV 
efforts of volunteers with paid canvassers, paid live or automated phone calls, and/or direct mail with a 
GOTV message. 
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In addition, a GOTV operation relies on the field operation's previous direct voter contact work. 
The recruitment and training of capable volunteers, the location of supporters or strong subsets of 
support, an accurate database of voters, and tested systems to support contacting large number of 
supporters in a small time-frame are all essential. Within campaigns, the sophistication and 
modernization of direct voter contact work is rapidly evolving with the addition of web-based voter 
contact systems which support phone banking, door-to-door canvassing, and other voter contact work. 
They can produce the tools and support the reporting necessary to a successful field operation. 
Candidate campaigns of the highest order, the presidential-level, use databases like the Voter Activation 
Network or Voter Vault and highly trained operatives to conduct professional field operations expending 
millions and millions of dollars in a single state to do so. The questions surrounding the most effective 
manner in which to allocate field resources, and which methods or techniques will yield the best result, 
are of vital importance to campaigns and their field practitioners. 
In 2010, Vice Mayor Jim Gray and Mayor Jim Newberry of Lexington, Kentucky faced off in a 
non-partisan general election for the office of Mayor. These candidates were the top vote-getters from 
the primary the previous May. In that primary, Newberry advanced with 21,648votes or 44 percent, and 
Gray advanced with 17,703 or 36 percent. Former Mayor Teresa Isaac trailed with 8,216 votes, or 17 
percent. At the conclusion of the most expensive campaign for Mayor of Lexington in history, Jim Gray 
defeated Jim Newberry. The final numbers had Gray defeating Newberry 53% to 46%. Based on the 
extensive data on hand from the field operations of Jim Gray, the following study will assess the 
effectiveness of his GOTV targeting and whether or not the field operations had a statistically significant 
impact on Gray's performance. 
II. Literature Review 
The academic research surround these critical questions is somewhat limited, however it does 
exist. One of the most notable researchers on the topic is Dr. Alan Gerber. In examining the field and 
GOTV operations, Gerber and Green (2000) have tested the effectiveness of various types of 
campaigning. Their work in 2000 supports the allocation of campaign resources to direct voter contact. 
Yes, voter turnout was increased substantially by personal canvassing. Research by Arceneaux and 
Nickerson (2009) concluded, "Yes, face-to-face canvassing is effective with conditions." Gerber and 
Green (2000) go on to say that their "findings support that the long term retrenchment in voter turnout 
is partly attributable to the decline in face-to-face political mobilization." Overall researchers have been 
finding that personalized approaches are a far more effective way to mobilize voters than some of the 
more dominant, impersonal methods used in recent decades. (Reed 2007) 
To the question of the most effective technique to be utilized in GOTV operations, Gerber and 
Green (2000) "have found that the way in which a turnout appeal is delivered has a critical effect on the 
effectiveness of the appeal. Personal, unhurried appeals are usually far superior to impersonal, 
mechanical and rushed communications." This finding is relevant not only to the technique utilized by a 
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volunteer or campaign representative at the door of a supporter, but to the question of the 
effectiveness of automated or live paid telephone calls for GOTV efforts. 
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In the realm of voter targeting, the existing research informs on the type of voter who is the 
most likely to respond to a GOTV message. Gerber and Green (2000) conclude that these efforts 
"increase turnout mostly by enticing those who are on the cusp of voting." In econometric terms, that 
would be translated as a possible voter with probability near 50%, which suggests a probit model, which 
is used below. More sophisticated campaigns will account for this by targeting voters with an 
inconsistent voting history. Arnceneaux and Nickerson (2009) offered "that the type of voter for whom 
mobilization is effective is contingent on the electoralcontext. In a low-salience election, where few 
people in the electorate are either aware of orinterested in the campaign, only high-propensity voters 
will be receptive to canvassers'blandishments to vote." They go on to say that a campaign will be wise 
to contact only "cusp" voters in campaigns that are intensely covered, as their messages to vote will be 
wasted on high-propensity voters in this type of election. 
Additionally, researcher Hlllygus finds that "voting cannot be mobilized by campaigns". Hlllygus 
used a dichotomous system to distinguish regular voters from those voters who are not. "In contrast, 
Niven (2001, 2004) directly tests and finds support for the curvilinear treatment effect hypothesis. 
Niven argues that politically disengaged individuals will quickly forget campaign messages, while those 
who regularly vote will not require any persuasion to turnout." While the debate continues, most 
practitioners target so called "drop off voters" or those voters who vote in presidential elections but not 
in the off-year elections. At this point, it can be considered the best guess. 
Ultimately, the challenges associated with testing direct voter contact and GOTV operations and 
delivering conclusions that are both scientifically sound and relevant to campaign practitioners or 
observers are great. The type of campaign, candidate or issue, the characteristics of the electorate, the 
size of a campaign budget, the candidate or issue, the political environment, the makeup of the election 
itself, the evolution of the campaign, the lack of solid, specific measurable data and any other number of 
factors make these types of studies difficult. Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) attempted to take on this 
challenge. "In their study of the research and findings of Eldersveld 1956, Gosnell1927, Miller, Bositis 
and Baer 1981, among others used random assignment to construct comparable treatment and control 
groups, and produce convincing evidence that door-to-door Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) drives increase 
turnout 7 to 10 percentage points (Gerber and Green 2000; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003)." This 
is some of the strongest evidence of the effective of field operations on voter turnout. 
Additionally, Green and Gerber in their 2004 book, "Get Out The Vote", performed a 
comprehensive study of numerous other electoral campaign studies and at almost every level of 
government, in an attempt to come up with some more definitive, scientific answers to the 
effectiveness of field operation tactics and techniques for practitioners to apply in the field. They noted 
"The rigorous scientific study of voter mobilization requires something more than reams of data and 
impressive-sounding correlations. It requires a method for making fair comparisons between instances 
where a campaign tactic was or was not used." (Green and Gerber 2004) 
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In the book, Green and Gerber concluded that door-to-door canvassing with volunteers as the 
lowest per vote cost among several other commonly used campaign techniques. In a table on page 94 
of the book, the dollar cost per vote for a number of campaign tactics was presented as follows for non-
partisan elections (given a set of basic, reasonable assumptions) were: Door-to-Door Canvassing 
$19/vote, Leafleting $43/vote, Direct Mail $67 /vote, Volunteer Phone Bank $35/vote, Commercial Live 
Calls with no special coaching $200/vote, and Commercial Live Calls with coaching $45/vote. (Green and 
Gerber, 2004) In terms of specific increase in turnout rates, Green and Nickerson 2003 found that 
turnout increased from 44% in the control group to 53% among those canvassed. (Green and Nickerson 
2003).1n the context of the struggle of campaigns to optimize resource use among a large set of 
competing and viable alternatives, this information, though not universally accepted, is extremely 
helpful. 
To the question of the contact technique to be utilized in field operations and GOTV operations, 
the book said, "Mobilizing voters is not merely a matter of reminding them that election day is near. 
Prerecorded messages reminding people to vote do little, if anything, to raise turnout, even when the 
prerecorded voices are those of well-known and credible people. Mobilizing voters is not simply a 
matter of engaging their attention. Live calls from commercial phone banks typically have weak 
effects." (Green and Gerber 2004)David Nickerson has added to the technique debate with his 2006 
journal article on the topic of volunteer phone calls, finding that, at a level quality and personalization, 
phone calls boosted turn out 3.8 percentage points. (Nickerson 2006) 
Ill. Econometric models, variables, and hypotheses 
To study the results of a political campaign, it is ideal to have data from small areas, with good 
control variables. Some of the studies described above used controlled experiments, but in the absence 
of that, an adequate set of explanatory variables in a regression can permit a test of the effectiveness of 
Get Out the Vote efforts. The present study concerns a Mayoral election in Lexington, Kentucky, with 
data from 287 precincts, of which 264 have all necessary variables. This provides a detailed breakdown 
of votes in a single metropolitan area. 
There are two dependent variables. The first is the designation by the Jim Gray campaign of 
precincts as "Get Out the Vote" target precincts. Of 285 precincts with this information, 105 were so 
designated. The second is the change in the percentage of votes received by Jim Gray in the runoff. 
Gray had been second of three candidates in the primary, won the runoff, and thus had a large increase 
in percentage of votes received. 
The model to be applied to targeting is pro bit, which is a model of the propensity to do 
something designated as a variable equal to 1 (yes) or 0 (no). The model assumes an underlying 
continuous normal propensity which is observed as yes or no, a discrete outcome. The model estimates 
the effects of explanatory variables on the propensity to declare a precinct a target, then the marginal 
impact calculation shows the estimated effect in percentage points on the probability. 
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The model to be applied to the percentage change is linear regression, with appropriate 
explanatory variables. 
The explanatory variables include the following variables from each precinct from the primary, 
which control for conditions in the precinct before any Get Out the Vote efforts or designation as a 
target. Jim Gray's percentage of the primary vote controls for existing support for the ultimately 
successful candidate. In the context of Lexington, Teresa Isaac's percentage of the primary vote is 
particularly important, as she is a former Mayor who placed third in the primary and subsequently 
endorsed Jim Gray over the incumbent. Controlling for general politics, the historical Democratic 
performance by precinct should code the political culture of each precinct. 
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The effectiveness of the field operations is then measured through a number of precise 
measures of activity. First, the designation as a target precinct is a dummy variable (O=no, 1=yes). 
Regardless of that, there might be activity in the precinct, and there are five measures: Staff/Volunteer 
canvass, paid employee canvass, staff/volunteer Get Out the Vote activity, paid employee Get Out the 
Vote activity, and whether a house party was conducted (dummy variable, 0 =no, 1 =yes). 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables. Jim Gray 
increased his percentage by an average of 91% in going from second of three in the primary to the 
winner of the general election. The amount of field activity varied a lot by precinct. 
Table 1: Summary statistics (287 total precincts) 
Variable observations mean S.d. min max 
Get Out the Vote designation 285 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Gray percentage change 279 91.43 1.48 -100 1160 
Gray primary percentage 278 34.22 10.53 8 71 
Isaac primary percentage 28S 18.87 11.37 0 70 
Democratic performance 270 51.76 12.27 31 92 
Turnout percentage 270 43.52 11.03 13 70 
Staff/volunteer canvass 278 22.02 52.82 0 292 
Paid canvass 279 31.65 73.30 0 355 
Staff/volunteer GOTV 279 55.45 103.62 0 460 
Paid GOTV 279 70.89 166.81 0 863 
House party 279 0.05 0.24 0 2 
Note: Gray percentage change is very large in several very small precincts. 
The expectation would be that GOTV activity would increase Gray's percentage of the vote, and 
that the Isaac percentage would also do so, because she endorsed Gray. All candidates are Democrats 
in this non-partisan election, so the effect of Democratic performance is unpredictable, and the effect of 
Gray's primary percentage is similarly unpredictable. Success in the primary might indicate that Gray 
had successfully attracted voters he could attract already, or could signal further possible gains. 
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IV. Results 
On our first question, the level at which a Gray, Isaac, Dem History or Turnout Percentage 
precinct predicted a precinct to be a GOTV target or not, the following was estimated. See Table 2 for 
the pro bit coefficients (predicting propensity) and Table 3 (marginal impacts on the probability of 
designation). 
Table 2- Pro bit predicting GOTV Targeting 
z 
Coefficient Standard Error Score P>lzl 
Gray Primary PCT 9.34 1.58 5.92 <0.001 
Isaac Primary PCT 13.21 2.05 6.45 <0.001 
Dem History PCT 4.85 1.63 2.98 0.003 
Turnout PCT 0.75 1.36 0.55 0.583 
Table 3- Pro bit predicting GOTV Targeting--Marginal Impacts 
z 
Coefficient Standard Error Score P>lzl 
Gray Primary PCT 3.54 0.60 5.95 <0.001 
Isaac Primary PCT 5.01 0.81 6.21 <0.001 
Dem History PCT 1.84 0.62 2.95 0.003 
Turnout PCT 0.28 0.52 0.55 0.584 
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The best predictor of a GOTV target precinct was an Isaac precinct with a predicted effect of 5 
percentage points per point of Isaac's primary percentage and a large z score of 6.45 (p<0.001). Closely 
following the Isaac precinct score, was a Gray primary precinct with a predicted effect of 3.5 percentage 
points per point Gray's primary percentage and a large z score of 5.92 (p<0.001). The Democratic 
History precincts also were more likely to be targeted, but here the effect is predicted to be 1.8 
percentage points per point of Democratic support in the precinct. This is also statistically significant (z 
= 2.98, p=0.003). The Turnout Percentage has a small and statistically insignificant effect. The actual 
designation in this case was done by people in the Gray campaign with a weight that they chose, but the 
above pro bit shows the best estimate of the implicit process of selection. In particular, strong Isaac 
districts, strong Gray districts, and to some extent, relatively Democratic districts are targeted, but 
turnout, whether intentional or not, played no statistically significant role in selecting precincts. 
The second question is the effectiveness of the field operations, both individually and 
collectively, controlling for primary results. The linear regression provided the following estimates. See 
Table 4. 
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Table 4-Regression predicting Percentage Change in Gray Vote 
Coefficient Standard Error T Score P>ltl 
Isaac Primary PCT 5.17 1.46 3.53 <0.001 
Gray Primary PCT -5.60 0.87 -6.47 <0.001 
Dem History PCT 2.78 0.84 3.32 0.001 
Turnout PCT -1.69 0.71 -2.38 0.018 
Staff/Vol Canvass 0.0006 0.0007 0.83 0.408 
Paid Canvass 0.0007 0.0011 0.63 0.531 
Staff/Vol GOTV 0.0010 0.0011 0.90 0.367 
PaidGOTV -0.0002 0.0005 -0.34 0.733 
House Party -0.0013 0.1230 -0.01 0.992 
GOTVTarget -0.3056 0.2241 -1.36 0.174 
The primary controls predict strongly the gains by Jim Gray. Higher Isaac support is associated 
with gains of five percentage points per point of Isaac support in the primary (z=3.53, p<0.001). The 
regression cannot show whether this was a result of endorsement by Teresa Isaac, information provided 
by Teresa Isaac to the Gray campaign, or just the act of Isaac voters themselves switching to Gray. 
Whichever of these (or several) matters, the effect is very large. Gray primary support is associated with 
much smaller gains, by five percentage points per point of primary support. This could be a result of 
changes in political position in a general election as opposed to a primary or a result of lesser gains 
available on the margin or both. Heavily Democratic districts are associated with higher gains (z=3.32, 
p<0.001). Districts with higher primary turnout percentage also had lower gains for Jim Gray, perhaps 
because the margin for gains was smaller with an already higher turnout. 
The analysis finds the t scores for none of the specific field operations [Staff/Volunteer Canvass, 
Paid Canvass, Staff/Volunteer GOTV, Paid GOTV, House Party, nor GOTV Target] meet the minimum 
level of statistical significance. The t scores are as follows: Staff/Volunteer Canvass 0.83, Paid Canvass 
0.63, Staff/Volunteer GOTV 0.9, Paid GOTV -0.34, House Party -0.01, and GOTV Target -1.36. Table 5 
shows a test of all of these together, and they are statistically insignificant. Collectively, the analysis of 
all field operations did not reach the minimum level of statistical significance, with an F value of 0.63, 
and a p-value of 0.7037. There is no statistical evidence of an effect of these operations, net of other 
factors. This means that there is no statistical evidence that the level of field operations, or being 
designated a target precinct, changed Jim Gray's vote percentage controlling for the primary results and 
Democratic history. 
Table 5-Test of Collective Field Operations 
F (6, 252) = 0.63 
Prob> F = 0.7037 
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This result would undoubtedly be disappointing to those working to increase Gray's vote, but it 
indicates that other factors, perhaps the endorsement by Teresa Isaac, had already done much of the 
work. With 13,197 door knocks and 31,976 GOTV touches completed during the campaign, there is an 
undoubtedly some impact, but for the purposes of this study the impact was not found to be statistically 
significant. The goal of the operation also might have been more insurance or guarding against a close 
outcome, which in the event, did not occur: Gray won by a large margin. 
V. Conclusions 
On the question of what characteristics tended to make a precinct targeted, the results show 
very clearly that the precinct being one in which Teresa Isaac was successful in the primary election 
mattered a lot. This reinforces, on a scientific level, the perception held among informed political 
observers; that the endorsement of Teresa Isaac had a major impact on her supporters, who did turn 
out and vote for Jim Gray in the general election. 
Looking further, the results of the GOTV analysis tell us that the performance by Gray in the 
primary was matched in the general election. Gray was able to maintain his base of support, while 
building on it among Isaac supporters. This is important because the campaign selected a more fiscally 
conservative message, and there was concern that some of the more liberal or progressive base Gray 
had previously gained might be lost. Per these results, this did not occur. But note that strongly Gray 
precincts had lower gains, so the change in message might have been manifest there. Finally, precincts 
with a history of being more democratic than republican did indicate a GOTV precinct. This is less 
important because all candidates are registered democrats, and the race is non-partisan. Nonetheless, 
the data again suggest Gray held his base. 
Moving into the second question, the effectiveness of the field operations, the results are 
somewhat surprising, given the review of literature. None of the individual field elements meet the 
minimum scores for significance, nor did they collectively. The larger take away suggests that voters 
were going to vote how they were going to vote, regards of any contact from the campaign. In light of 
the fact that the candidates had run against one another in May, and the race was a local affair, this can 
also be understood, despite the review of the literature. Note that the results are not evidence that 
field operations are ineffective, only the absence of evidence that they are effective. 
There are a number of limitations to be considered in this study. First, with a small campaign 
window, a limited budget and a volunteer base that was robust but not sufficient to cover the entire 
jurisdiction, not all precincts were touched and others not at the level which might be preferred given 
their importance. The decisions of strategy and to which precincts to send canvassers are often one of 
choosing between precincts of high importance and high importance. Of course, both factors are almost 
always the case in a campaign, but it is worth noting for the purposes of better understanding the 
results here. 
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Other factors to consider in examining and understanding the results, though unable to 
measure, are the national political mood, the other campaign activities, including the campaign work of 
Mayor Isaac, and the other races on the ballot. It is tough to believe that the overall, strong anti-
incumbency mood of the electorate didn't negatively affect the incumbent Newberry, and assisted Gray, 
especially with his message of an outsider and business man, not politician. It almost certainly did. 
Additionally, the Gray campaign had a significant presence on TV, sent targeted direct mail, and 
supported Mayor Isaac in activating her political base. Finally, the ballot included a United States Senate 
race and contested Congressional race, which conducted their own campaign activities and turned out 
voters outside of the norm. 
On the other hand, the detailed information and local setting of this Mayoral election allow this 
data set to comment on Get Out the Vote and field operations effects in a very specific election. 
References 
Arceneaux, Kevin, and David Nickerson. 2009. "Modeling Certainty with Clustered Data: A Comparison 
of Methods. "Political Analysis (2009), 17 (2): 177-90. 
Green, D.P., and Gerber, A. S. Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout. 2"' ed. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2008. Print. 
Green, Donald and Nickerson, David W. 2003. "Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six 
Doar-ta-Door Canvassing Experiments"Journal of Politics, 65 (4): 1083-1096. 
Gerber, A.S. and Green, D.P. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter 
Turnout: A Field Experiment. "American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 653-663. 
Gerber, A.S., Green, D.P., and Larimer, C. W. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-
Scale Field Experiment. "American Political Science Review102.1 (2008): 33-48. 
Gerber, Alan. 2004. "Does Campaign Spending Work?: Field Experiments Provide Evidence and Suggest 
New Theory. "American Behavioral Scientist, 47(5): 541-574. 
Hillygus, D.S. "Campaign Effects and the Dynamics of Turnout Intention in Election 2000."Journal of 
Politics, 66.1 (2005): 50-68. 
Nickerson, D.W. "Who is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-Analysis of Eleven Randomized Field 
Experiments."American Journal of Political Science 53.1 (2009): 1-16. 
Nickerson, David. 2006. "Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout: Evidence From Eight Field 
Experiments. "American Politics Research, 34(3): 271-292. 
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE TARGETING AND EFFECTIVENESS TECHNIQUES 12 
Niven, David. 2001. "The Limits of Mobilization: Turnout Evidence from State House Primaries."Political 
Behavior, 23(4): 335-50. 
Niven, David. 2004. "The Mobilization Solution? Face-to-Face Contact and Voter Turnout in Municipal 
Elections. "Journal of Politics, 66(3): 868-85 
Reed, Daniei."Why the Methods Matter: The Effectiveness of Party Contacting Since the 1950s" Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, 
Chicago, IL, Apr 12, 2007. 
Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) Targeting and the 
Effectiveness of Direct Voter Contact Techniques 
on Candidate Performance 
Samuel Taylor Coots 
University of Kentucky 
U N 1 'll 1!: !II~ .!il 1 T 'I!' {:!• £'" 
KEN'.·.· .. ,ru: .. . . . c· ."""""y 2""'11: Till -,_ ; - ---" _· ·,--
Introduction 
~ In any political campaign, candidate, issue or 
otherwise, the strategic, targeted use of 
campaign resources, time and money mostly, is 
critical in optimizing performance 
~ Candidate campaigns at almost any level will 
consist of several components: communications, 
finance, and field operations. 
~ Communications handles the campaign message 
and its delivery, finance raises the funds 
necessary to conduct the work of the campaign, 
and field operations are charged with managing 
individual voters, or subsets of voters. 
Introduction 
~ In terms of the strategic, targeted use of 
resources within a field operation, the challenge 
is to identify and turnout the number of 
supporters necessary to win an election within a 
limited time-frame and budget. 
~ Most field operations will conduct some sort of 
major effort on, or in the days directly leading up 
to, election day. Most often this element of a 
field operation or program is referred to as its 
Get-Out-The-Vote operation, or GOTV. 
Introduction 
~ In addition, a GOTV operation relies on the field operation's 
previous direct voter contact work. The recruitment and training 
of capable volunteers, the location of supporters or strong 
subsets of support, an accurate database of voters, and tested 
systems to support contacting large number of supporters in a 
small time-frame are all essential. 
~ The questions surrounding the most effective manner in which to 
allocate field resources, and which methods or techniques will 
yield the best result, are of vital importance to campaigns and 
their field practitioners. 
~ In 2010, Vice Mayor Jim Gray and Mayor Jim Newberry of 
Lexington, Kentucky faced off in a non-partisan general (or run-
off from the primary) election for the office of Mayor. At the 
conclusion of the most expensive campaign for Mayor of 
Lexington in history, Jim Gray defeated jim Newberry. 
~ Based on the extensive data on hand from the field operations of 
Jim Gray, the following study will assess the effectiveness of his 
GOTV targeting and whether or not the field operations had a 
statistically significant impact on Gray's performance. 
Review of Literature 
~ The academic research surround these critical 
questions is somewhat limited, however it does 
exist. One of the most notable researchers on 
the topic is Dr. Alan Gerber. In examining the 
field and GOTV operations, Gerber and Green 
(2000) have tested the effectiveness of various 
types of campaigning. 
~ Their work in 2000 supports the allocation of 
campaign resources to direct voter contact. Yes, 
voter turnout was increased substantially by 
personal canvassing. 
~ Research by Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) 
concluded, "Yes, face-to-face canvassing is 
effective with conditions." 
Review of Literature 
~ Overall researchers have been finding that 
personalized approaches are a far more 
effective way to mobilize voters than some of 
the more dominant, impersonal methods 
used in recent decades. (Reed 2007) 
~ In the realm of voter targeting, the existing 
research informs on the type of voter who is 
the most likely to respond to a GOTV 
message. Gerber and Green (2000) conclude 
that these efforts "increase turnout mostly by 
enticing those who are on the cusp of voting." 
Review of Literature 
~ Ultimately, the challenges associated with testing direct voter 
contact and GOTV operations and delivering conclusions that are 
both scientifically sound and relevant to campaign practitioners 
or observers are great. 
~ The type of campaign, candidate or issue, the characteristics of 
the electorate, the size of a campaign budget, the candidate or 
issue, the political environment, the makeup of the election 
itself, the evolution of the campaign, the lack of solid, specific 
measurable data and any other number of factors make these 
types of studies difficult. 
~ Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) attempted to take on this 
challenge. "In their study of the research and findings of 
Eldersveld 1956, Gosnell 1927, Miller, Bositis and Baer 1981, 
among others used random assignment to construct comparable 
treatment and control groups, and produce convincing evidence 
that door-to-door Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) drives increase 
turnout 7 to 1 0 percentage points (Gerber and Green 2000; 
Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003)." 
Review of Literature 
~ Additionally, Green and Gerber in their 2004 book, "Get Out The 
Vote", performed a comprehensive study of numerous other 
electoral. They noted "The rigorous scientific study of voter 
mobilization requires something more than reams of data and 
impressive-sounding correlations. It requires a method for 
making fair comparisons between instances where a campaign 
tactic was or was not used." (Green and Gerber 2004) 
~ In the book, Green and Gerber concluded that door-to-door 
canvassing with volunteers as the lowest per vote cost among 
several other commonly used campaign techniques: Door-to-
Door Canvassing $19 /vote, Leafleting $43 /vote, Direct Mail 
$67 /vote, Volunteer Phone Bank $35/vote, Commercial Live Calls 
with no special coaching $200/vote, and Commercial Live Calls 
with coaching $45 /vote. (Green and Gerber, 2004) 
~ In terms of specific increase in turnout rates, Green and 
Nickerson 2003 found that turnout increased from 44% in the 
control group to 53% among those canvassed. (Green and 
Nickerson 2003). In the context of the struggle of campaigns to 
optimize resource use among a large set of competing and 
viable alternatives, this information, though not universally 
accepted, is extremely helpful. 
Econometric models, 
variables, and hypotheses 
~ The present study concerns a Mayoral election in 
Lexington, Kentucky, with data from 287 
precincts, of which 264 have all necessary 
variables. 
~ There are two dependent variables. The first is 
the designation by the Jim Gray campaign of 
precincts as "Get Out the Vote' target precincts. 
Of 285 precincts with this information, 1 OS were 
so designated. 
~ The second is the change in the percentage of 
votes received by Jim Gray in the runoff. Gray 
had been second of three candidates in the 
primary, won the runoff, and thus had a large 
increase in percentage of votes received. 
Econometric models, 
variables, and hypotheses 
~ The model to be applied to targeting is probit, 
which is a model of the propensity to do 
something designated as a variable equal to 1 
(yes) or 0 (no). The model assumes an 
underlying continuous normal propensity which 
is observed as yes or no, a discrete outcome. 
~ The model estimates the effects of explanatory 
variables on the propensity to declare a precinct 
a target, then the margina impact calculation 
shows the estimated effect in percentage points 
on the probability. 
~ The model to be applied to the percentage 
change is linear regression, with appropriate 
explanatory variables. 
Econometric models, 
variables, and hypotheses 
~ The effectiveness of field operations/GOTV is 
then measured through a number of precise 
measures of activity: 
o First, the designation as a target precinct is a 
dummy variable (O=no, 1 =yes). 
o Regardless of that, there might be activity in the 
precinct, and there are five measures: 
• Staff /Volunteer canvass, 
• Paid Employee canvass 
• Staff ;volunteer Get Out the Vote Activity, 
• Paid employee Get Out the Vote activity 




Isaac is by far the 
best predictor, with a 
Gray precinct second. 
One the question 
of what predicts a 
GOTV Target 
Preci net, the res u Its 
were: 
Results 
No field technique by itself 
had a statistically significant 
impact on Gray's performance, 
nor did they collectively. 
Conclusions 
~ In the pro bit model, the resu Its show very clearly that 
the precinct being one in which Teresa Isaac was 
successful in the primary election mattered a lot. This 
reinforces, on a scientific level, the perception held 
among informed political observers; that the 
endorsement of Teresa Isaac had a major impact on 
her supporters, who did turn out and vote for Jim Gray 
in the general election. 
~ Looking further, the results of the GOTV analysis tell 
us that the performance by Gray in the primary was 
matched in the general election. Gray was able to 
maintain his base of support, while building on it 
among Isaac supporters. 
~ Finally, precincts with a history of being more 
democratic than republican did indicate a GOTV 
precinct. 
Conclusions 
~ On the effectiveness of the field operations, the 
results produce a somewhat surprising result, 
given the review of literature. None of the 
individual field elements meet the minimum scores 
for significance, nor did they collectively. The 
larger take away suggests that voters were going to 
vote how they were going to vote, regards of any 
contact from the campaign. 
~ Note that the results are not evidence that field 
operations are ineffective, only the absence of 
evidence that they are effective. 
Conclusions 
~ As a limitation of the study, the small campaign window, a 
limited budget and a volunteer base that was robust but not 
sufficient to cover the entire jurisdiction, not all precincts were 
touched and others not at the level which might be preferred 
given their importance. 
~ Other factors to consider in examining and understanding the 
results, though unable to measure, include: 
o The national political mood, 
o The other campaign activities, including the campaign work of Mayor 
Isaac, and the other races on the ballot. 
o The overall, strong anti-incumbency mood of the electorate didn't 
negatively affect the incumbent Newberry, and assisted Gray, especially 
with his message of an outsider and business man, not politician. 
o Additionally, the Gray campaign had a significant presence on TV, sent 
targeted direct mail, and supported Mayor Isaac in activating her political 
base. 
~ On the other hand, the detailed information and local setting of 
this Mayoral election allow this data set to comment on Get Out 
the Vote effects in a very specific election. 
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